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Abstract
We define a modification of the standard Kripke model, called the ordered Kripke model,
by introducing a linear order on the set of accessible states of each state. We first show this
model can be used to describe the lexicographic belief hierarchy in epistemic game theory,
and perfect rationalizability can be characterized within this model. Then we show that each
ordered Kripke model is the limit of a sequence of standard probabilistic Kripke models with
a modified (common) belief operator, in the senses of structure and the (ε-)permissibilities
characterized within them.
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1. Preliminaries
In this section we give surveys on lexicographic belief and permissibility (Section 1.1)
and on probabilistic Kripke model for games (Section 1.2). These will be preparation for
the introduction of ordered Kripke model in Section 2.
1.1. Lexicographic belief and permissibility
In this subsection we give a survey on lexicographic epistemic model (with complete
information) and the definition of permissibility. For a details, see Perea [16], Chapter 5.
Consider a finite 2-person strategic form game G = (N, {Si}i∈N , {ui}i∈N) where I = 1, 2. A
finite lexicographic epistemic model for G is a tuple M lex = (Θi, βi)i∈N where
(a) Θi is a finite set of types, and
(b) βi is a mapping that assigns to every θi ∈ Θi a lexicographic belief over ∆(Sj ×Θj), i.e.,
βi(θi) = (βi1, βi2, ..., βiK) where βik ∈ ∆(Sj ×Θj) for k = 1, ..., K.
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Let θi ∈ Θi with βi(θi) = (βi1, βi2, ..., βiK). Each βik (k = 1, ..., K) is called θi’s level-k
belief. For (sj, θj) ∈ Sj × Θj, we say θi deems (sj, θj) possible iff βik(sj, θj) > 0 for some
k ∈ {1, ..., K}. We say θi deems θj ∈ Θj possible iff θi deems (sj, θj) possible for some
sj ∈ Sj. For each θi ∈ Θi, we denote by Θj(θi) the set of all θj ∈ Θj deemed possible by θi.
Definition 1.1 (Caution) Type θi ∈ Θi is cautious iff for each θj ∈ Θj(θi) and each
sj ∈ Sj, it deems (sj, θj) possible.
For each si ∈ Si, let ui(si, θi) = (ui(si, θi1)., .., ui(si, θiK)) where for each k = 1, ..., K,
ui(si, θik) := Σ(cj ,tj)∈Cj×Tjβik(sj, θj)ui(si, sj), that is, each ui(si, θik) is the expected utility
for si over θik and ui(si, θi) is a vector of expected utilities. For each si, s
′
i ∈ Si, we say that
θi prefers si to s
′
i, denoted by ui(si, θi) > ui(s
′
i, θi), iff there is k ∈ {0, ..., K − 1} such that
the following two conditions are satisfied:
(a) ui(si, θi`) = ui(s
′
i, θi`) for ` = 0, ..., k, and
(b) ui(si, θi,k+1) > ui(s
′
i, θi,k+1).
We say that θi is indifferent between si and s
′
i, denoted by ui(si, θi) = ui(s
′
i, θi), iff ui(si, θik) =
ui(s
′
i, θik) for each k = 1, ..., K. It can be seen that the preference relation on Si under each
type θi is a linear order. si is rational (or optimal) for θi iff θi does not prefer any choice to
si.
Definition 1.2 (Primary belief in the opponent’s rationality) Let θi ∈ Θi with
βi(θi) = (βi1, βi2, ..., βiK). θi primarily believes in j’s rationality iff θi’s primary belief θi1
only assigns positive probability to those (sj, θj) where sj is rational for θj.
Definition 1.3 (Common full belief in a property) Let P be an arbitrary property of
lexicographic types.
(a) θi ∈ Θi expresses 0-fold full belief in P iff θi satisfies P ;
(b) For each n ∈ N, θi ∈ Θi expresses (n+ 1)-fold full belief in P iff θi only deems possible
j’s types that express n-fold full belief in P.
θi expresses common full belief in P iff it expresses n-fold full belief in P for each n ∈ N.
Definition 1.4 (Permissibility). Given a lexicographic epistemic modelM lex = (Θi, βi)i∈N
for a game G = (N, {Si}i∈N , {ui}i∈N), si ∈ Si is permissible iff it is optimal to some θi ∈ Θi
which expresses common full belief in caution and primary belief in rationality.
Example 1.1 Consider the game G as follows (Myerson [15]):
u1\u2 C D
A 1, 1 0, 0
B 0, 0 0, 0
and M lex = (Θi, βi)i∈N for G where Θ1 = {θ1}, Θ2 = {θ2}, and
β1(θ1) = ((C, θ2), (D, θ2)), b2(t2) = ((A, θ1), (B, θ1)).
It can be seen that A is permissible since it is optimal to t1 which expresses common full
belief in caution and primary belief in rationality.
2
It is shown by Proposition 5.2 in Asheim and Dufwenberg [2] that a strategy is permissible
if and only if it survives an algorithm called Dekel-Fudenberg procedure (Dekel and Fudenberg
[12]). Given a game G, by Dekel-Fudenberg procedure we mean the process that (1) at first
round we eliminate all weakly dominated strategies in G, and (2) then iteratedly eliminate
dominated strategies until no strategies can be eliminated.
1.2. Probabilistic Kripke model for games
In this subsection we give a survey of the probabilistic Kripke model for games which
is a generalization of the standard Kripke model that is able to capture both pure and
mixed strategies. For details, see Bonanno [6], [7]. Let G = (N, {Si}i∈N , {ui}i∈N) be
a 2-person strategic form game. A probabilistic Kripke model of G is a tuple M =
(W, {Ri}i∈N , {pi}i∈N , {σi}i∈N) where
(1) W 6= ∅ is the set of states (or possible worlds), sometimes called the domain of M and
is denoted by D(M);
(2) For each i ∈ N , Ri ⊆ S × S is the accessibility relation for player i. For each w ∈ W, we
use Ri(w) to denote the set of all accessible states from w, i.e., Ri(w) = {w′ ∈ W : wRiw′};
(3) For each i ∈ N, pi is a mapping from W to ∆(W ) satisfying (a) for each w ∈ W, supp
pi(w) ⊆ Ri(w), and (b) for each w′ ∈ Ri(w), pi(w′) = pi(w);
(4) For each i ∈ N, σi is a mapping from W to Si such that for each w′ ∈ Ri(w),
σi(w
′) = σi(w).
(W, {Ri}i∈N , {σi}i∈N) is a standard Kripke model of G. Mo = (W, {Ri}i∈N) is called the
Kripke frame of M. Here we follow the literatures and assume that Mo is a KD45 frame,
i.e., each Ri is serial, transitive, and Euclidean. For each i ∈ N, a semantic belief operator
is a function Bi : 2W → 2W such that for each E ⊆ W,
Bi(E) = {w ∈ W : Ri(w) ⊆ E}. (1)
A semantic common belief operator is a function CB : 2W → 2W such that for each E ⊆ W,
CB(E) = {w ∈ W : ∪i∈NRi(w) ⊆ E}. (2)
It can be seen that Bi and CB correspond to Aumann [3]’s standard concept “knowledge”
and “common knowledge”.
At w ∈ W the strategy si ∈ Si with si is at least as prefered to s′i iff ui(si,Σw′∈Ri(w)pi(w)(w′)σj(w′)) ≥
ui(s
′
i,Σw′∈Ri(w)pi(w)(w
′)σj(w′)). si is prefered to s′i at w iff the strict inequality holds. si is
optimal at w iff there is no strategy preferred to si at w. A state w is rational for i iff σi(w)
is optimal at w. We use RATi to denote the set of all rational states for player i, and define
RAT = ∩i∈NRATi.
The following statement connects iterated elimination of pure dominated strategies (an
algorithm) to rationality (an epistemic concept). Its proof can be found in Bonanno [7],
p.452.
Theorem 1.1 (Iterated elimination of dominated strategies and Kripke model).
Let G = (N, {Si}i∈N , {ui}i∈N) and SIEDS be the set of strategy profiles surviving iterated
3
elimination of dominated strategies. Then
(1) given an arbitrary probabilistic Kripke model of G, if w ∈ CB(RAT ), then σ(w) ∈ SIEDS;
(2) for each s ∈ SIEDS, there is a probabilistic Kripke model of G and a state w such that
σ(w) = s and w ∈ CB(RAT ).
2. Ordered Kripke Model of Games and Permissibility
In this section we define the ordered Kripke model as a modification of the standard one
and show how it can be used to describe the lexicographic reasoning in game theory.
Definition 2.1 (Ordered epistemic model) Let G = (N, {Si}i∈N , {ui}i∈N) be a 2-person
strategic form game. An ordered Kripke model ofG is a tupleM = (W, {Ri}i∈N , {σi}i∈N , {λi}i∈N)
where
(1) (W, {Ri}i∈N , {σi}i∈N) is a standard Kripke model of G, and
(2) For each i ∈ N , λi assigns to each w ∈ W an injection from a cut {1, ..., K} of nat-
ural numbers to the set of probability distributions (with finite supports) over Ri(w), i.e.,
λi(w) : {1, ..., K} → ∆(Ri(w)). λi(w) can be interpreted as a linear order on a finite subset
of ∆(Ri(w)). We use D(λi(w)) and R(λi(w)) to denote the domain and the range of λi(w),
i.e., D(λi(w)) = {1, ..., K} and R(λi(w)) = {λi(w)(1), ..., λi(w)(K)}.
Definition 2.2 (Caution). Let G = (N, {Si}i∈N , {ui}i∈N) be a strategic form game and
M = (W, {Ri}i∈N , {σi}i∈N , {λi}i∈N) an ordered Kripke model for G. Ri is cautious at w ∈ W
iff for any sj ∈ Sj (j 6= i), there exists w′ which is assigned a possitive probability by some
element in R(λi(w)) such that σj(w′) = sj. We say M is cautious iff for each i ∈ N , Ri is
cautious at every w ∈ W .
The difference between the ordered Kripke model and the standard one is that the
former assigns a linear order λi(w) on Ri(w) for each state w. This order is used to define
the preferences in the model. We have the following defintion.
Definition 2.3 (Lexicographic preferences) LetG = (N, {Si}i∈N , {ui}i∈N) be a strategic
form game and M = (W, {Ri}i∈N , {σi}i∈N , {λi}i∈N) an ordered Kripke model for G. At
w ∈ W the strategy si ∈ Si is at least as lexicographically prefered to s′i, denoted by si w s′i,
iff ∃k ∈ {0, ..., |D(λi(w))|} such that
(a) ui(si, σj(σj(λi(w)(t)))) = ui(s
′
i, σi(λi(w)(t))) for all t ≤ k;
(b) ui(si, σj(λi(w)(k + 1))) = ui(s
′
i, σi(λi(w)(k + 1))).
Here by σj(λi(w)(t)) we mean the mixture of stategies in σj(λi(w)(t)). Therefore
ui(si, σj(σj(λi(w)(t)))) = Σw′∈Ri(w)λi(w)(t)(w
′)ui(si, σi(w′)).
It can be seen that when k = |D(λi(w))|, si and s′i generates the same payoff for player
i along λi(w). This case is denoted by si 'w s′i. When k 6= |D(λi(w))|, we say that si is
lexicographically prefered to s′i at w, denoted by si w s′i. si is optimal at w iff there is no
s′i ∈ Si such that s′i w si. We say a state w is lexicographically rational for i iff the choice
σi(w) is optimal for i. For each i ∈ N, let LRATi be the set of rational states for player i
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and LRAT = ∩i∈NLRATi.
Example 2.1. Consider the following game G in Example 1.1:
u1\u2 C D
A 1, 1 0, 0
B 0, 0 0, 0
and an ordered Kripke model M as follows:
Figure 1: An ordered Kripke model for G
It can be seen thatM is cautious. It can be seen that A and C are optimal in each state,
w1 and w2 are rational for player 1, and w1 and w3 are rational for player 2. Therefore,
LRAT1 = {w1, w2}, LRAT2 = {w1, w3}, and LRAT = {w1}. On the other hand, as men-
tioned in Example 1.1, since both σ1(w2) = A and σ2(w2) = D are permissible strategies,
lexicographic rationality in the ordered Kripke model here captures the concept of “a strat-
egy is rational under a lexicographic belief” in the first order. Now the problem is how to
define belief hierarchy and common belief in this model. It can be seen that we cannot adopt
Bi and CB in standard approach. Indeed, in Example 2.1 Bi(LART ) = CB(LART ) = ∅,
which is contradictory to our intention to preserve w2. Here we give one approach. For each
i ∈ N and w ∈ W, let R1i (w) = {w′ ∈ W : λi(w)(1)(w′) > 0} and R1 = ∪i∈NR1i . A semantic
level-1 belief operator for player i is a mapping B1i : 2W → 2W such that for each E ⊆ W,
B1i (E) = {w ∈ W : R1i (w) ⊆ E}. (3)
Similarly, a semantic common level-1 belief operator is a mapping CB1 : 2W → 2W such
that for each E ⊆ W,
CB1(E) = {w ∈ W : ∪i∈NR1i (w) ⊆ E}. (4)
It can be seen that B1i (LRAT ) = CB
1(LRAT ) = {w1} in Example 2.1. In general, we have
the follwong result.
Theorem 2.1 (Permissibility and semantic common level-1 belief). Let G =
(N, {Si}i∈N , {ui}i∈N) be a strategic form game and SPER ⊆ S be the set of permissible
strategy profiles. Then
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(1) given an arbitrary cautious ordered Kripke model of G, if w ∈ CB1(LRAT ), then
σ(w) ∈ SPER, and
(2) for each s ∈ SPER, there exists a cautious ordered Kripke model of G such that σ(w) = s
and w ∈ CB1(LRAT ).
To show Theorem 2.1, we need the following lemma.
Lemma 2.1. Let G = (N, {Si}i∈N , {ui}i∈N) be a strategic form game and SDF ⊆ S be
the set of strategy profiles surviving Dekel-Fudenberg procedure. Then given an arbitrary
cautious ordered epistemic model of G, if w ∈ CB1(LRAT ), then σ(w) ∈ SDF .
Proof. For each n ∈ N, we use SDFn to denote the set of strategy profiles surviving the
first n rounds of Dekel-Fudenberg procedure. Let M = (W, {Ri}i∈N , {σi}i∈N , {λi}i∈N) be a
cautious ordered epistemic model of G and w ∈ W. We show that if w ∈ CB1(LRAT ), then
σ(w) ∈ SDFn for each n ∈ N. First, since M is cautious, it can be seen that σ(w) ∈ SDF1.
Indeed, if there is some i ∈ N such that σi(w) is eliminated in the first round of Dekel-
Fudenberg procedure, then there is some ri ∈ ∆(Si). Then it follows from Theorem 5.8.3 in
Perea [16] (p.215, 221-226) σi(w) cannot be optimal to any cauious belief, i.e., it cannot be
optimal on λi(w), which is contradictory since w ∈ LRATi.
Now we show that σ(w) ∈ SDF2. Suppose for some i ∈ N , σi(w) is eliminated in
the second round of Dekel-Fudenberg procedure, i.e., there exists ri ∈ ∆(SDF1i ) such that
ui(ri, sj) > ui(si, sj) for all sj ∈ SDF1j . On the other hand, since w ∈ CB1(LRAT ), σi(w) is
optimal to λi(w)(1). This implied that some strategies supporting λi(w)(1) has been elimi-
nated in the first round. However, since w ∈ CB1(LRAT ), it follows from the definition that
supp λi(w)(1) ⊆ LRAT, which, from the argument above, implies that all strategies w′ ∈
supp λi(w)(1) should have survived the first round and σj(w
′) stay in SDF1j , a contradiction.
Now suppose that σ(w) ∈ SDF1 ∩ ... ∩ SDFn but disappeared in SDFn+1. This could
happen only if some strategies supporting λi(w)(1) had been eliminated in the n-th round,
which is because some strategies supporting that strategy in λi(w)(1) in (n − 1)-th round,
etc. Finally this leads to the second and first rounds, which, by the argument above, is
impossible. Therefore σ(w) ∈ SDFn+1. //
Proof of Theorem 2.1: (1) Since, by Proposition 5.2 in Asheim and Dufwenberg [2], any
strategy surviving Dekel-Fudenberg procedure is permissible and vice versa, i.e., SPER =
SDF , (1) directly follows from Lemma 2.1.
(2) Let s ∈ SPER, that is, for each i ∈ N, si is optimal to some type expressing common full
belief in caution and primary belief in rationality in a lexicographic epistemic model M lex =
(Tj, bj)j∈N . We construct an ordered Kripke model M = (W, {Ri}i∈N , {σi}i∈N , {λi}i∈N)
based on M lex as follows:
(1) Let W = T × S, here T = Πi∈NTi;
(2) for each w = (t1, t2, s1, s2), σi(w) = si;
(3) Connectiong each state in W according to M lex, i.e., for each w = (t1, t2, s1, s2), w
′ =
(t′1, t
′
2, s
′
1, s
′
2) ∈ T ×S, w′ = λi(w)(k) iff ti = t′i, si = s′i, and (s′j, t′j) is the k-th entry in bi(ti);
mixed strategy-type pairs are defined in a similar way.
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Without loss of generality, we can assume that each type in M lex is cautious.1 It can be
seen that M is also cautious, and there is w ∈ W with σ(w) = s and w ∈ CB1(LRAT ). //
3. Ordered Kripke Model as the Limit of Probabilistic Kripke Models
Though the ordered Kripke model is not the first framework combining standarad Kripke
model with an order on (a subset of) each Ri(w) (cf. Baltag and Smets [4], [5]), here we are
interested in how such a model can be connected to the probabilistic Kripke model for games
introduced in Section 1. In this section we will first introduce a probabilistic Kripke model
with modified belief operators under which ε-perfect rationalizability can be characterized.
Then we will show that an ordered Kripke model can be seen as a “limit” of a sequence of
probablistic Kripke models.
3.1. Probabilistic belief and ε-perfect rationalizability
In this subsection we give a survey on probabilitstic epistemic model (with complete
information) and the definition of ε-perfect rationalizability. See Perea [16], Chapter 2
for the detail of the former. ε-permissible, which originates from Myerson [15], is defined
in a similar way as ε-proper rationalizability as in Schuhmacher [18] and Perea and Roy
[17]. Consider a finite 2-person strategic form game G = (N, {Si}i∈N , {ui}i∈N). A finite
probabilistic epistemic model for G is a tuple Mpro = (Ti, bi)i∈N where
(a) Ti is a finite set of types, and
(b) bi is a mapping that assigns to every ti ∈ Ti a probability distribution over ∆(Sj × Tj).
For each si ∈ Si and ti ∈ Ti, we define ui(si, ti) = Σ(sj ,tj)∈Sj×Tjbi(ti)(sj, tj)ui(si, sj). si
is optimal (or rational) for ti iff ui(si, ti) ≥ ui(s′i, ti) for any s′i ∈ Si. For each si, s′i ∈ Si
and ti ∈ Ti, si is preferred to s′i under ti iff ui(si, ti) > ui(s′i, ti). Given ti ∈ Ti, for each
(sj, tj) ∈ Sj × Tj, we say ti deems (sj, tj) possible iff bi(ti)(sj, tj) > 0. We say ti deems
tj ∈ Tj possible iff ti deems (sj, tj) possible for some sj ∈ Sj. For each ti ∈ Ti, we denote by
Tj(ti) the set of all tj’s deemed possible by ti.
Definition 3.1 (Caution) Type ti ∈ Ti is cautious iff for each tj ∈ Tj(ti) and each sj ∈ Sj,
ti deems (sj, tj) possible.
Definition 3.2 (ε-perfect trembling condition) Type ti ∈ Ti satisfies ε-perfect trembling
condition iff for any sj ∈ Sj and tj ∈ Tj(ti) such that ti deems (sj, tj) possible, if sj is not
optimal under tj then bi(ti)(sj, tj) ≤ ε.
Definition 3.3 (Common full belief in a property) Let P be an arbitrary property of
probabilistic types.
(a) ti ∈ Ti expresses 0-fold full belief in P iff ti satisfies P ;
(b) For each n ∈ N, ti ∈ Ti expresses (n + 1)-fold full belief in P iff ti only deems possible
j’s types that express n-fold full belief in P.
ti expresses common full belief in P iff it expresses n-fold full belief in P for each n ∈ N.
1For a state that is not cautious we can extend it into a cautious one. See Liu [14].
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Definition 3.4 (ε-Perfect rationalizability). Given a probabilistic epistemic model
Mpro = (Ti, bi)i∈N for a game G = (N, {Si}i∈N , {ui}i∈N), si ∈ Si is ε-permissible iff it is
optimal to some ti ∈ Ti which expresses common full belief in caution and ε-perfect trem-
bling condition.
Example 3.1. Consider the following game G (from Myerson [15]):
u1\u2 C D
A 1, 1 0, 0
B 0, 0 0, 0
and Mpro = (Ti, bi)i∈N for G where T1 = {t1}, T2 = {t2}, and
b1(t1) = (1− ε)(C, t2) + ε(D, t2), b2(t2) = (1− ε)(A, t1) + ε(B, t1),
where ε ∈ (0, 1). It can be seen that A is ε-permissible since it is optimal to t1 which
expresses common full belief in caution and ε-perfect trembling condition.
Originally, by the definition in Myerson [15], perfect equilibrium is the limit of ε-perfect
equilibrium. Though permissibility is the concepts in epistemic game theory and is defined
in a different manner, it still holds tha permissibility is the limit of ε-permissibility. See
Schuhmacher [18].
3.2. Characterizing ε-permissibility in probabilistic Kripke model
In this subsection, we show how to use probabilistic Kripke model to describe ε-permissibility.
LetG = (N, {Si}i∈N , {ui}i∈N) be a 2-person strategic form game andM = (W, {Ri}i∈N , {pi}i∈N , {σi}i∈N)
a probabilistic Kripke model for G. We give the following definitions
Definition 3.5 (Caution). M is cautious at w ∈ W for i ∈ N iff for any sj ∈ Sj (j 6= i),
there exists w′ ∈ Ri(w) satisfying pi(w)(w′) > 0 and σj(w′) = sj. We say M is cautious iff
M is cautious at every w ∈ W for each i ∈ N .
Definition 3.6 (ε-perfect trembling condition). M satisfies ε-perfect trembling condi-
tion at w ∈ W for i ∈ N iff for each w′ ∈ Ri(w), if σi(w′) (i.e., σi(w)) is not optimal to
σj(w
′), then pi(w)(w′) ≤ ε.
The above two concepts are illustrated in the following example.
Example 3.1. Consider the game G in Example 1.1:
u1\u2 C D
A 1, 1 0, 0
B 0, 0 0, 0
and a probabilistic Kripke model depicted as in Figure 2.
It can be seen that RAT1 = {w1, w2}, RAT2 = {w1, w3}, and RAT = RAT1 ∩ RAT2 =
{w1}. Since σ(w1) = (A,C) is a pair of ε-perfect rationalizable strategies, RAT can still
be used in this framework for the first-order. Now the problem is how to describe higher
orders, i.e., interpersonal belief and common full belief in this framework. Bi and CB in
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Figure 2: An probabilistic Kripke model for G
standard probabilistic model do not work here since Bi(RAT ) = CB(RAT ) = ∅, while we
want to keep w1. Here we provide an approach. Let M = (W, {Ri}i∈N , {pi}i∈N , {σi}i∈N , ) a
probabilistic Kripke model for G satisfying caution and ε-perfect trembling condition. For
each i ∈ N, we define R>εi = {w′ ∈ Ri(w) : pi(w)(w′) > ε}. An upper ε semantic belief
operator is a function B>εi : 2W → 2W such that for each E ⊆ W,
B>εi (E) = {w ∈ W : R>εi (w) ⊆ E}. (5)
An upper ε semantic common belief operator is a function CB>ε : 2W → 2W such that for
each E ⊆ W,
CB>ε(E) = {w ∈ W : ∪i∈NR>εi (w) ⊆ E}. (6)
When ε < 1
2
, it can be seen that in Example 3.1, CB>ε(RAT ) = {w1}.
In general, we have the following statement.
Theorem 3.1 (Characterizing ε-perfect rationalizability). LetG = (N, {Si}i∈N , {ui}i∈N)
be a 2-person strategic form game, ε < 1
2
, 2 and SεPER ⊆ S be the set of ε-permissible strat-
egy profiles. Then
(1) given an arbitrary probabilistic Kripke model of G satisfying caution and ε-perfect trem-
bling condition, if w ∈ CB>ε(RAT ), then σ(w) ∈ SεPER, and
(2) for each s ∈ SεPER, there exists a probabilistic Kripke model of G satisfying caution
and ε-perfect trembling condition such that σ(w) = s and w ∈ CB>ε(RAT ).
Proof. (2) can be proved in a similar way as Theorem 2.1. Here we only prove (1). Since
there is no algorithm like Dekel-Fudenberg procedure that can screen out ε-permissibility, we
show how to construct a type which expresses common full belief in caution and ε-perfect
trembling condition. Let M = (W, {Ri}i∈N , {pi}i∈N , {σi}i∈N) be a probabilistic Kripke
model for G satisfying caution and ε-perfect trembling condition and w ∈ CB>ε(RAT ). For
i ∈ N, we define a partition Ei = {Ei1, ..., Ei`i} of W and satisfies that for each w′, w′′ ∈ W,
2It should be noted that ε < 12 makes sure that R
>ε
i (w) 6= Ri(w), though from the viewpoint of conver-
gence/limit this is just a technical requirement.
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w′ and w′′ belong to the same equivalent class Ei if and only if Ri(w′) = Ri(w′′) and
pi(w
′) = pi(w′′). For each Ei ∈ Ei we assign a symble ti(Ei). Without loss of generality, we
can assume that for each si ∈ Si and each Eik, there is some w′ ∈ Eik such that σi(w′) = si.3
Let Ti = {ti(Ei)}Ei∈Ei , and define bi(ti(Ei)) with the same probability as pi(w′), where
w′ ∈ Ei, and the corresponding tj(Ej). It can be seen that bi(ti(Ei)) is well-defined since
every state in one Ei has identified distributions. It can be seen straightforwardly that
σ(w) ∈ SεPER since for each i ∈ N, σi(w) is optimal to the type corresponding to w which
expresses common full belief in caution and ε-perfect trembling condition since M satisfies
caution and ε-perfect trembling condition. //
3.3. Probabilistic Kripke models converge to ordered Kripke model
In this subsection we show that any ordered Kripke model is the limit of a sequence
of probabilistic Kripke models. This can be intuitively seen by comparing the two Kripke
models in Example 2.1 and 3.1: Indeed, Figure 2 can be obtained by replacing 1−ε with 1 and
ε with 2 in Figure 1. Also, this can be seen from that perfect rationalizability characterized
by the former is the limit of a sequence of ε-perfect rationalizabilities characterized by the
later. In this section we show how to formulate this idea.
Let G = (N, {Si}i∈N , {ui}i∈N) be a 2-person strategic form game andM = (W, {Ri}i∈N ,
{σi}i∈N , {λi}i∈N) be an ordered Kripke model of G. Without loss of generality, we assume
that M satisfies the following two conditions:
(Disjoint supports) For each i ∈ N , w ∈ W, and k, k′ ∈ D(λi(w)), supp λi(w)(k)∩ supp
λi(w)(k
′) 6= ∅ if and only if k 6= k′; 4
(Surjection) For each w ∈ W and each w′ ∈ Ri(w), there is some k ∈ D(λi(w)) such that
λi(w)(k)(w
′) > 0.5
Let ε ∈ (0, 1). Consider a probabilistic Kripke modelMε = (W ε, {Rεi}i∈N , {pεi}i∈N , {σεi }i∈N)
of G satisfying
(a) W ε = W, Rεi = Ri and σ
ε
i = σi for each i ∈ N ;
(b) for each i ∈ N, w ∈ W , and w′, w′′ ∈ supp λi(w)(k) for some k ∈ D(λi(w)), it is satisfied
that pεi (w)(w
′)/pεi (w)(w
′′) = λi(w)(k)(w′)/λi(w)(k)(w′′);
(c) for each i ∈ N, w ∈ W , and w′ ∈ Ri(w), 0 < pεi (w)(w′) ≤ ε if λi(w)(1)(w′) = 0.
3This corresponds to caution for probabilistic epistemic model Mpro. It should be noted that even this
condition is not satisfied, we can construct “dummies” to make this condition satisfied without hurt the
model.
4This condition is adopted in some papers such as Blume et al. [8], [9] while is not required in some others
such as the standard textbook of Perea [16]. Technically, this condition is not necessary in characterizing
rationalizabilities. Here we use it out of simplification.
5Surjection is different from caution. Caution requires each strategy of the opponent should appear in
the range. When there are multiple states in Ri(w) which are assigned the same strategy, to be cautious
only means that at least one of those state should appear in the range, while surjection requires that each
of these states should appear. On the other hand, it does not mean that surjection implies caution since
surjection has nothing with strategies assigned to each state in Ri(w). In finite models, when surjection is
not satisfied, we can faithfully extend each model into one which satisfies surjection without hurting LRAT
and CB(LRAT ).
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It can be seen that when ε is small enough, such Mε exists (not unique). Let {εn}n∈N be
a sequence in (0, 1) that converges to 0 such that for each εn, there is some probabilistic
Kripke model satisfying (a) - (c). We choose an arbitrary Mεn satisfying (a) - (c) for each
εn. It can be seen that the sequence {Mεn}n∈N “converges” to M in the sense that
(1) for each i ∈ N, w ∈ W , and w′ ∈ Ri(w) such that pεni (w)(w′) → 0, w′ does not appear
in λi(w)(1);
(2) for each i ∈ N, w ∈ W , and w′ ∈ Ri(w) such that pεni (w)(w′) 9 0, w′ ∈ supp λi(w)(1)
and pεni (w)(w
′)→ λi(w)(1)(w′);
(3) The convergence is propotional within each level of λi(w).
6
More formally, this convergence can be seen from the rationalizabilities they characterize.
We have the following statement.
Theorem 3.2 (Probabilistic models converge to ordered model). Let G be a 2-
person strategic game,M a cautious ordered Kripke model of G satisfying disjoint supports
and surjection, {εn}n∈N a sequence in (0, 1) converging to 0, and {Mεn}n∈N be a sequence
of probabilistic model of G satisfying condition (a) - (c) above for each εn. Then each w
which is commonly believed to be lexicographically rational in M is commonly believed to
be εn-upper rational in Mεn for each εn, i.e., CB1(LRAT ) = ∪M∈N ∩n>M CB>εn(RATεn).
Proof. (⊆) Let w ∈ CB1(LRAT ). It follows from Theorem 2.1 that σ(w) ∈ SPER, that
is, there is a lexicographic model (Θi, βi)i∈N such for each i ∈ N , σi(w) is optimal to some
θi ∈ Θi which expresses common full belief in caution and primary belief in rationality.
Based on each Mεn , θi can be accordingly translated into a state tεni “starting” from w in
probabilistic model. Since σi(w) is optimal to some θi, when εn is small enough, σi(w) is
optimal to tεni , and t
εn
i expresses common full belief on caution and εn-perfect trembling con-
dition. This argument holds for each i ∈ N. Then by Theorem 3.1 σ(w) ∈ CB>εn(RATεn),
and consequently w ∈ ∪M∈N ∩n>M CB>εn(RATεn).
(⊇) Let w ∈ ∪M∈N ∩n>M CB>εn(RATεn), that is, for some M ∈ N, w ∈ CB>εn(RATεn)
for all n ≥ M. Since εn → 0, it follows that for each i ∈ N, σi(w) is optimal on pεni (w) for
infinitely small εn. Since each Mεn keeps the propotion between states within each level of
λi(w), this implies that σi(w) is optimal to λi(w). Also, the state in the probabilistic model
of G corresponding to Mεn supporting σi(w) expresses common full belief in caution and
ε-perfect trembling condition. Since M is surjective, it follows that the corresponding type
in the lexicographic model forM expresses common full belief in caution and primary belief
in rationality. Therefore σi(w) is perfect rationalizable inM. Since this argument holds for
all i ∈ N, it follows that w ∈ CB1(LRAT ). //
6To dealing those “irrational” choice which is assigned in probability 0 in any rational belief is one of the
motivation for the introduce of lexicographic belief and studies from conditional probability. See Blume et
al. [8], [9], Brandenburger et al. [11], Halpern [13].
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4. Concluding Remarks
4.1. Convergence and proper rationalizability
In Section 2, we characterized permissibility by ordered Kripke model. Though it is de-
sirable to characterize other rationalizability concepts, e.g., proper rationalizability (Asheim
[1]), in the ordered Kripke model, we think it is difficult, if not impossible. The reason
is that in this framework, the difference between perfect and proper rationalizabilities is at
what kind of order λi(w) gives on Ri(w), which more relies on the interpretation than on the
structure. In other words, by changing the order on accessable states we can characterize
proper rationalizability; but this is attributed to the interpretation we give to each state, not
to any structural properties of the Kripke frame (W, {Ri}i∈N) like seriality or transitivity.
On the other hand, using the approach introduced in Section 3.3, proper rationalizability
can be discussed as the limit of probabilistic Kripke models. Let G be a 2-person strategic
form game and a cautious ordered Kripke modelM satisfies a condition parallel to “respect-
ing the opponent’s preferences”. For ε > 0, considerMε = (W ε, {Rεi}i∈N , {pεi}i∈N , {σεi }i∈N)
a probabilistic Kripke model of G satisfying conditions (a), (b) in Section 3.3 and (c′) for
each i ∈ N, w ∈ W , and w′, w′′ ∈ Ri(w), 0 < pεi (w)(w′) ≤ εpεi (w)(w′′) if λi(w)(k′)(w′) > 0,
λi(w)(k
′′)(w′′) > 0, and k′′ > k′. It can be seen that (1) each probabilistic Kripke model sat-
isfying (a), (b), and (c′) characterizes some ε-perfect rationalizable strategies; (2) M is the
limit of a sequence {Mεn}n∈N satisfying (a), (b), and (c′); and (3) the perfect rationalizable
strategies characterized in M is limits of εn-perfect rationalizable strategies characterized
by {Mεn}n∈N.
4.2. Syntactical system
In this paper we have defined the ordered Kripke model to capture the concept of ratio-
nality under lexicographic belief hierarchy by a semantical approach. It is wondered that
whether there exists a syntactic approach corresponding to that semantic framework, like
the one developed in Bonanno [6] for the standard Kripke model for games. A critical prop-
erty for that syntactic system, if exists, is that the change of the criterion for truth value
from the first order to higher orders in the hierarchy, that is, in the first order we need (at
most) to check every accessible state, while in the second order B1i we need only to check
the first level states, etc. Works are expected in this direction.
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